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ABSTRACT In this paper, we establish a cryptographic primitive for wireless communications. An asymmet-
ric physical layer encryption (PLE) scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography is proposed. Compared with
the conventional symmetric PLE, asymmetric PLE avoids the need of key distribution on a private channel,
and it has more tools available for processing complex-domain signals to confuse possible eavesdroppers
when compared with upper-layer public key encryption. We use quantized information entropy to measure
the constellation confusion degree. The numerical results show that the proposed scheme provides greater
confusion to eavesdroppers and yet does not affect the bit error rate (BER) of the intended receiver (the
information entropy of the constellation increases to 17.5 for 9-bit quantization length). The scheme also
has low latency and complexity [O(N 2.37), where N is a fixed block size], which is particularly attractive for
implementation.
INDEX TERMS Encryption, physical layer security, orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM),
wireless communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is always an important issue in communications
networks, and more so for wireless networks due to its broad-
cast nature. Encryption has been the technology to provide
security. For example, in long-term evolution (LTE) systems,
a number of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, including
SNOW 3G [1], ZUC [2] and AES [3] have been applied
but have faced new challenges in 5G scenarios. In partic-
ular, the application scenarios, such as enhanced mobile
broadband (eMBB), massive machine type communications
(mMTC), and ultra-reliable and low latency communica-
tion (URLLC), put new requirements on security, which are
explained as follows.
1) Low latency: Low latency and high security com-
munication technologies are required in applications
such as vehicular networks and remote surgery, etc.
In these scenarios, the wireless networks need to
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Md. Arafatur Rahman.
provide reliable communication with delay less than
1 millisecond.
2) Low-power consumption and low complexity: Due
to the limited battery life of some devices such as
wireless sensors and mobile phones, secure transmis-
sion technology also requires low complexity and low
power algorithms.
3) Heterogeneous access and massive users: Hetero-
geneity will be one of the network functions of the
next generationwireless network. Heterogeneity comes
not only from the use of different access technolo-
gies (WiFi and LTE) but also from multiple network
environments, which may mean that the access net-
work architecture from different networks is different.
Therefore, designers need to consider building a secu-
rity architecture that is appropriate for different access
technologies.
4) Simple and robust key distribution: In the mMTC
scenario, the number of users is massive, making it
difficult to manage and distribute keys.
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5) Security does not rely on channel information and
eavesdropper status: Due to the variety of 5G appli-
cation scenarios, the secure transmission algorithm
should be adaptable to different kinds of channel envi-
ronments. In addition, due to the presence of passive
eavesdroppers in the network, the security algorithm
should not rely on the eavesdropper channel and loca-
tion information.
We are looking for a secure communication method that
meets the above five features for 5G scenarios. Physical layer
encryption (PLE) may be a good choice. PLE is a different
approach from the bit layer cryptography and information
theory based physical layer security [4]. Compared to upper-
layer encryption at the bit-level, PLE facilitates processing
of complex-valued signals to confuse eavesdroppers. Unlike
physical layer security methods based on artificial noise and
beamforming [5]–[9], PLE does not require a positive secrecy
rate, nor channel state information. Therefore, PLE offers
an alternative to achieve lower latency, lower complexity
and higher security for secure transmission. Various PLE
approaches have been proposed in systems such as orthogonal
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) [10], [11], massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [12]–[14], untrusted
relaying systems [15], IEEE 802.15.4 protocols [16], rateless
codes [17] and sparse-code multiple-access (SCMA) [18].
Our previous work established mathematical models, design
frameworks and cryptographic primitives for stream PLE and
block PLE [19]. In [20]–[22] the keys were extracted through
the wireless channel, if it satisfies some conditions such as
channel reciprocity.
In the literature, most of the PLE studies considered sym-
metric PLE schemes. That is, the same key is used at both the
transmitter and receiver. However, a symmetric PLE scheme
is not suitable for multiuser scenarios, particularly when the
number of users is large, and it is hard to manage a large
number keys. In addition, asymmetric PLE eliminates the
preliminary exchange of secret keys and allows for public
keys to be shared with anyone. Therefore, we prefer the
use of asymmetric PLE (APLE or public key) to reduce the
complexity of key distribution and key management. There
are already many mature asymmetric encryption algorithms
in the upper layers [23], [24], but there is very little work in
the physical layer. Of relevance is the work [12] in which
a method was proposed using a massive MIMO channel as
the key between the sender and the desired receiver, but this
method requires the transmitter to know the channel state
information for precoding whichmay be impractical for some
scenarios.
In this paper, we will present the cryptographic primi-
tives of an APLE system. In the APLE system, encryption
and decryption use different keys. The encryption key is
issued as a public key, and the decryption key is stored
as a private key only in the legitimate receiver. APLE has
different characteristics from existing physical layer secu-
rity and upper layer public key encryption technologies in
that:
1) The processing objects in APLE are physical layer
complex signals, while the public key cryptography
processing objects are bits. Therefore, new mathemat-
ical models and tools are needed in APLE, and eaves-
droppers cannot even get bit data.
2) APLE may have lower latency and complexity for
lightweight applications in 5G networks.
3) In APLE the effects of wireless channels and noise can
be exploited to enhance security.
4) Compared to the precoding or beamformingmethod [5],
[25], [26], APLE does not require multiple antennas
and channel information at the transmitter, and it is
suitable for both single antenna systems and multi-
antenna systems, which has advantages in heteroge-
neous networks.
In this paper, we propose an APLE design based on elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC).1 A security matrix generation
algorithm is first proposed, and then the generated security
matrix is used to encrypt the physical layer signal block of
the transmitted signal. This method makes each input bit
dispersed into the entire output signal block, thereby causing
confusion at the output signal. Our design goal is to make
eavesdroppers difficult to demodulate the constellation and
recover the bit data while ensuring that the bit error ratio
(BER) of the legitimate receiver is not degraded.
Notation: XT , X∗, XH and X−1 denote, respectively,
the transpose, conjugate, conjugate transpose and inverse of
matrix X. In addition, IN denotes the N -dimensional identity
matrix, and |x| denotes the absolute value of a complex
scalar x. We will use ‖·‖ to denote the Euclidean norm of
a vector. Cn represents the space of n × 1 vectors with
complex elements. Cm×n and Rm×n represent the space of
all m× n matrices with complex elements and real elements
respectively. For sets A and B, A × B = { (a, b) | a ∈ A
and b ∈ B }, where × is the Cartesian product between
two sets. Given two positive numbers, a (the dividend) and
n (the divisor), a mod n is the remainder of the Euclidean
division of a by n.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
OF APLE
As shown in Fig. 1 the basic system model consists of a
legitimate transmitter (Tx), Alice, that wants to communicate
securely with a legitimate receiver (Rx), Bob, in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve. The public key and private key are
used on the Alice and Bob sides, respectively.
Definition 1: APLE system
Message spaceM: the set of plaintext messages, a finite
set. All input messages S ∈M.
Cipher signal space C: the set of all possible ciphers. All
cipher signals Y ∈ C.
Key space K,K′: possible encryption key (public key)
set K, and possible decryption key (private key) set K′.
1ECC is a public key encryption approach set on elliptic curve theory that
is used to create faster, smaller, and productive cryptographic keys.
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FIGURE 1. System model of APLE.
The encryption keyK is chosen fromK, and the decryption
key K ′ is chosen from K′, and so K ∈ K, K ′ ∈ K′.
Key generation algorithm G :→ K ×K′.
G is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a key pair
(K , K ′) ∈ K ×K′.
Encryption algorithm T : M ×K→ C.
Channel function HB : C → Z .
H is the equivalent channel function between cipher signal
Y and received symbol ZB, ZB = HB(Y ). Z is the set of all
possible ZB, and ZB ∈ Z .
K is the key set and Cn is a (n× 1) complex vector space;
for stream PLE, complex sequence {rn} = {r1, r2, . . .} ∈ Cn.
Decryption algorithm D : Z ×K′→M.
Note that although the above model only defines a single-
user scenario, it can be easily extended to a multiuser sce-
nario. We only need to generate a public-key private-key pair
for each user. When other users want to send information to
this user, they use the corresponding public key to encrypt,
and the receiver can decrypt it with its own private key.
III. APLE ALGORITHM BASED ON ELLIPTIC CURVE
CRYPTOGRAPHY
From the definition in the previous section, we can see that the
essence of APLE is to design a mapping T from the massage
space (groups of bits) to the cipher signal space (complex
vectors), and an inverse mapping D. These processes involve
modulation and demodulation in a standard communication
system, which means that we can jointly design encryption
and modulation as a whole in order to achieve joint optimiza-
tion of security, reliability and transmission efficiency. How-
ever, in the design of a communication standard we also need
to consider compatibility and continuity. Therefore, this paper
retains the physical layer structure of existing communication
system, and inserts the physical layer security as a module
into the existing physical layer structure.
The basic structure of the system is shown in Fig. 2.
At the transmitter, the binary information S is converted into a
complex vector X by a mapping module. X is then converted
by a block change module into a complex vector Y according
to the security matrix U . Then the signal passes through the
IFFT module, the cyclic prefix (CP) module and then sent to
the radio frequency (RF) module for subsequent processing.
The processing flow of the receiver is reversed from that of
the transmitter.
The ECCM is an elliptic curve cryptographic operation
module whose function is to generate a security matrix U.
FIGURE 2. ECC based APLE.
Block change is a physical layer encryption module. dA and
dB are the private keys of Alice and Bob, and HA and HB
are the public keys of Alice and Bob. We will introduce each
module in the following sections.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Before introducing the entire algorithm, we will briefly intro-
duce the elliptic curve cryptography. Elliptic curves were
proposed for use as the basis for discrete logarithm-based
cryptosystems independently by Victor Miller of IBM and
Neal Koblitz of the University of Washington [27]. For the
purpose of cryptography, An elliptic curve E defined over a
finite field GF(p) is a set of points P = (x, y), where x and y
are elements of GF(p) that satisfy a certain equation:
y2 = x3 + ax + b, (1)
where a and b are elements of a finite field with p elements,
and p is an odd prime. a and b shall satisfy
4a3 + 27b2 6= 0( mod p). (2)
There are definitions of addition, subtraction, and scalar mul-
tiplication operations on elliptic curves, which are different
from operations on the ordinary number field. Detailed def-
initions can be found in [28]. In standard FIPS 186-4 [29],
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) rec-
ommends five prime fields for certain primes p of sizes 192,
224, 256, 384, and 521 bits. For each of the prime fields, one
elliptic curve is recommended.
B. APLE ALGORITHM
The whole algorithm is divided into four steps: private and
public key pairs generation, public keys exchange, security
matrix generation, block change and secure communication.
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1) PRIVATE AND PUBLIC KEY PAIRS GENERATION
First, an elliptic curve E defined overGF(p) with large group
of order n and a point G of large order is selected and
made public to all users. Then, the following key generation
primitive is used by each user to generate the individual public
and private key pairs.
1) Chose a random integer d from {1, · · · , n− 1} (where
n is the order of the subgroup).
2) Compute Q = d × G.
3) The private key is d and the public key is (E,G, n,Q).
Alice and Bob generate their own key pairs independently.
Alice has the private key dA and the public keyQA = dA×G,
Bob has the keys dB and QB = dB × G. Note that both Alice
and Bob are using the same domain parameters: the same
base point G on the same elliptic curve on the same finite
field GF(p).
2) PUBLIC KEYS EXCHANGE
Alice and Bob exchange their public keys QA and QB over a
public channel. Eve would intercept QA and QB, but will not
be able to find out either dA or dB without solving the discrete
logarithm problem.
3) SECURITY MATRIX GENERATION BY ECCM
Alice calculates Sk = dA×QB (using her own private key and
Bob’s public key), and Bob calculates Sk = dB×QA (using its
own private key and Alice’s public key). Here, Sk = (xs, ys)
is a point on the elliptic curve E . Then Alice and Bob need
to generate a unitary matrix from Sk . Note that Sk is the same
for both Alice and Bob, in fact:
Sk = dAQB = dA(dBG) = dB(dAG) = dBQA. (3)
The eavesdropper, however, only knows QA and QB
(together with the other domain parameters) and would not
be able to find out the shared point Sk . We call U ∈ CN×N
securitymatrix. The securitymatrix generation algorithmwill
be demonstrated in the next subsection.
4) BLOCK CHANGE AND SECURE COMMUNICATION
After Alice and Bob generate the security matrix, they
send U to their respective block change modules to com-
plete the physical layer encryption and decryption. X =
{X1,X2, . . . ,XN },Y = {Y1,Y2, . . .YN }. The process of
encryption on Alice is represented as
Y = UX . (4)
The process of decryption on Bob is represented as
X ′ = UHY ′, (5)
where X ′ and Y ′ recieved complex vector in Fig.2.
C. SECURITY MATRIX GENERATION ALGORITHM
The U matrix design needs to meet the following conditions:
• It must make the symbol module X fully confused and
disturbed.
• It must ensure that the performance of the constellation
is not changed after the transformation.
In our previous work, it has been proved that the unitary
matrix can well meet the above conditions [19]. We need to
generate the matrix U to satisfy the following conditions:
In fact any N × N unitary matrix U has N 2 independent
real phase parameters. Thus, we can generate an N × N
unitary matrix U from a given rotation direction vector, θ =
{θ1θ2, .., θN 2}.
The security matrix generation algorithm is given in
Algorithm 1,
Algorithm 1 Security Matrix Generation Algorithm
Require:
Shared point, Sk = (xs, ys);
Ensure:
Security matrix, U ;
1: Combine xs and ys to form a binary number S0;
2: for i= 1 to N 2 do
3: Si = S0 + i ∗ q (mod p); // q is a prime number and
p < q.
4: S ′i = hash(Si);
5: θi = 2pi (S ′i mod λ)/λ;
6: end for
7: Generate U from θ ;
8: return U ;
The details of the algorithm are as follows:
1) HASH FUNCTION
The purpose of the hash function is to shuffle the data so that
the distribution of the rotation angles is more uniform and
random. A hash function hash() is called collision free, if it
maps messages of any length to strings of some fixed length,
but such that finding s, y with hash(s) = hash(y) is a hard
problem.We can choose amature hash function such as SHA-
3 [30] to map Si to S ′i .
2) ROTATION DIRECTION VECTOR GENERATION
Considering the range of θi is [0, 2pi ) while the range of S ′i is
[0, 2L − 1]. L is the bit width of S ′i . Hence, a mapping from
θi to S ′i has to be constructed. We use the mapping function :
θi = 2pi (S ′iodλ)/λ, (6)
where λ is positive integer parameter which indicates phase
accuracy. For example, the λ value can be 256, which means
the phase accuracy is 2pi/256.
3) GENERATE U FROM θ
First construct an N ×N matrix using the rotation vector θ as
U ′ =

eθ1 , eθN+1 . . . eθN (N−1)+1
eθ2 , eθN+2 . . . eθN (N−1)+2
...
eθN , eθ2N . . . eθN2
 = [v1, v2, . . . , vN ] (7)
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Then we use GramâĂ"Schmidt process to orthonormalise
U ′ and get the unitary matrix U = [e1, e2, . . . , eN ].
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL
SIMULATIONS
In order to evaluate the performance of the algorithm, we ana-
lyze the security, constellation information entropy and bit
error rate performance. Simulation is based on the physical
layer of IEEE 802.11ac OFDM protocol which has been
widely used in a wireless local area network. We consider
the 256-point FFT with a cyclic prefix length of 1/4 of FFT
length. The parameters are: QPSK and 16QAM modulation,
FFT size = 256, a cyclic prefix length=64. We evaluate the
BER performance over a practical frequency selective fading
channel.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
ATTACKERS
On the eavesdropper side, we should prevent Eve from recov-
ering X , U or the private key d . We now consider the worst
case where Eve has the following ability:
• Eve is able to correctly perform channel estimation,
channel equalization, and recover the estimate of Y as
Ye = Y + W , where W ∈ CN is an additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector. From (4), we get
Ye = UX +W . (8)
• Eve knows the public key (E,G, n,Q).
The algorithm that we have designed need to prevent the
following possible attacks by Eve.
1) RECOVER d FROM PUBLIC KEY (E,G,n,Q).
(CIPHERTEXT-ONLY ATTACK)
The basis for the security of elliptic curve cryptosystems is the
apparent intractability of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm
problem (ECDLP). Elliptic curve cryptosystems offer the
highest strength-per-key-bit of any known public-key system.
With a 160-bit modulus, an elliptic curve systems offers the
same level of cryptographic security as DSA or RSA with
1024-bit moduli [31].
2) RECOVER U FORM Ye WITH THE KNOWN MESSAGE X .
(KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK)
Eve’s attack is equivalent to solving the equation (8) for U .
Because Eve does not know the noiseW, and the unknown
U contains N × N variables, it is an unsolvable equation.
If Eve uses brute force attack, its search space is, where is
phase resolution. Take N = 8, λ = 256, as an example and
its search space reaches 2512. The computational complexity
is certainly unaffordable for the eavesdroppers.
3) RECOVER d OR U FROM CHOSEN-PLAINTEXT
Eve can obtain the cipher signal for any specified plaintexts
for the current key d (chosen-plaintext attack).
This type of attack means that Eve has a lot of plaintext
ciphertext pairs (X , Ye), and Eve trys to solve a group of
FIGURE 3. The QPSK and 16QAM constellation before and after
encryption.
equations for U. It is obvious that the noise W plays an
uncertain role in the equations, which will prevent Eve from
obtaining U . In addition we also need to use PLE-block
chaining operation mode in [19]. PLE-block chaining XORs
the plaintext and the previous stage ciphertext, and then send
the result to the PLE encryption module. This is equivalent
to changing U for each block of encryption. So Eve cannot
solve for U even if she gets enough (X , Ye) pairs.
B. CONFUSION OF THE CONSTELLATIONS
Confusion of the constellations is an important indicator
of the security of physical layer encryption. Eavesdroppers
have the possibility of obtaining information by accumulating
observations for constellations over a long time. In order
to avoid this situation, we need more confusion in the
constellations.
Fig. 3 shows the QPSK and 16QAM constellation (Y =
c + d ∗ j) before and after encryption. We can see that
the constellation map is chaotic after encryption, there is no
obvious pattern, and it looks like noise. We use quantized
information entropy to measure the constellation confusion
degree:
H1(Y ) := −
∞∑
i=−∞
∞∑
j=−∞
Γ (i, j) log2 Γ (i, j), (9)
where Γ (i, j) = ∫ (i+1)1i1 ∫ (j+1)4j4 p(c, d)dcdd , p(c, d) is the
joint probability density function for c and d . 1 is quantifi-
cation accuracy. Larger information entropy means that the
constellation is highly chaotic and there is less leakage of
constellation information.
Fig. 4 shows that the information entropy increases with
increasing quantization length of constellation coordinates.
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FIGURE 4. Information entropy of constellations at the transmitter.
FIGURE 5. Information entropy of constellation at the receiver,
quantization length = 9 bits.
It is shown that our proposed method can increase the infor-
mation entropy of the constellation significantly.
Fig. 5 shows the information entropy of the BPSK, QPSK,
16QAM, and 64QAM constellation at the receiver with the
change of signal to noise ratio. It can be seen that in the
FIGURE 6. BERs of the legitimate user in an OFDM system.
non-encrypted scheme with the increase of SNR, the infor-
mation entropy shows a downward trend, which means that
the noise can make the constellation more chaotic. When the
signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropper increases, the infor-
mation entropy decreases and the constellation becomesmore
and more insecure. The eavesdropper may then obtain leaked
information from the statistical characteristics of the constel-
lation. However, in the proposed PLE method, the informa-
tion entropy of the constellation does not change with noise.
The encrypted constellation still has great confusion at high
SNR eavesdropper.
C. BER PERFORMANCE
In Fig. 6 we compare the BER performance of the pro-
posed PLE and non-encrypted systems in an OFDM system.
QPSK, 16QAM, and 64QAM modulation are considered.
The simulation shows that the proposed PLE encryption sys-
tem has almost the same bit error rate performance as the non-
encrypted system. Therefore, the proposed algorithm does
not deteriorate the BER performance and meets the design
requirements.
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The computational complexity of this PLE algorithm includes
two parts: one is the security matrix generation, and the other
is block change and secure communication. The security
matrix generation process is non-real-time and does not need
to run for every signal block. Block change is a real-time
encryption module that needs to run every time the signal
is transferred. Therefore, the computational complexity and
delay of the system are mainly generated by the block change
module.
The complexity of the block change algorithm is just an
N×N complex matrix multiplication added to the sender and
receiver respectively. The existing low-complexity matrix
multiplication algorithm is O(N 2.37) [32]. Note that N here
is not the data length, but the size of the block, which is
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FIGURE 7. The key number of asymmetric PLE and symmetric PLE.
a constant and not very large. In fact, there are already
many mature hardware implementations of matrix multipli-
cation with lower complexity and latency [33], [34]. N × N
matrix multiplication can be performed in N 2 + 2N cycles
using N processing elements [34]. For example if N = 8
and the clock is 200MHZ, then the delay is 80 clock
cycles or 10−9 seconds. Therefore, the complexity and delay
of the algorithm are not high, and it is easy to implement in
hardware.
Then we consider the key number under the multi-user
scenario. A comparison of the proposed asymmetric PLE
with the symmetric PLE technique is given in Fig. 7. The key
number for the asymmetric PLE is Nu and the key number
for the symmetric PLE is Nu(Nu − 1)/2, where Nu is the
number of users. As shown in Fig. 7, as the number of
users increases, the number of keys for the symmetric PLE
is very large. The number of keys for the asymmetric PLE is
small. This means that the asymmetric PLE has very low key
management complexity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper establishes a cryptographic primitive for an asym-
metric physical layer encryption system, which provides a
new path for PLE system design. Further an asymmetric
physical layer encryption scheme based on elliptic curve
cryptography is proposed. Compared with the existing sym-
metric PLE scheme, the scheme does not need to per-
form key distribution on a private channel, and is more
suitable for a multi-user communication scenario. Com-
pared with the upper-layer public key encryption scheme,
the physical layer signal can be protected and the security is
enhanced. Analysis and simulation show that the proposed
algorithm has a higher confusion of the constellations and
has the same BER performance as the non-encrypted sys-
tem. The algorithm has low latency and complexity and is
easy to implement in hardware which is suitable for some
5G scenarios.
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